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IN THE. SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
----------~-----~-----------------------------------------~------~-~----
FRANK R GEORGE doing business as ) 
r-RANK GEORGE AND SONS ) 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, ) ) 
Plaintiff-Respondent ) 
) 
vs ) Case No. 18359 
' 
I 
OREN LIMITED AND ASSOCIATES, ) 
a Utah partnership, ) 
) 
Defendant-Appellant ) 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
--~---------~---------------------~-~--~-------~-------~----------------
APPEAL FROM A JURY VERDICT ANO JUDGMENT 
OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY 
The Honorable Calvin Gould, Judge 
----------------------~---------~~--~~-----------~---~--------~---~-----
LORIN N PACE 
STEPHEN G HOMER 
P. 0. Box 493 
West Jordan, Utah 84084 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
Cannon, Hansen & Wilkinson 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
FILED 
SEP 161983 
-FiOSI"' 
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FRANK R. GEXR;E, dba 
GEORGE & SCN CDNS'IRUCTION, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
-vs-
CREN LIMI'IED & ASSOCIATES, 
a Partnership, 
Defendant-Appellant 
m '!HE SUPREME ClXJRT 
OF 'lHE STATE OF UTAH 
• 
• 
• 
• 
: Case No. 18359 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
BRIEF IN OPPa3ITICN 'ID REHEAR.Ill; 
S'lEffiEN G. HOMER 
P.O. Box 483 
West Jordan, Utah 84084 
Attorney for Plainti~f-Respondent 
PACE, KLIMI', WUNDERLI & PARSOOS 
By Lorin N. Pace 
1200 University Club Building 
136 Fast South Tenple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
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rn '!HE SUPREME CDURT 
OF '!HE STATE OF UTAH 
FRANK R. GOOR;E, dba • • 
GEDRGE & SOO CDNS'IRUCTION, 
• 
• 
Plaintif f-Resp:>ndent 
• 
• 
-vs- case No. 18359 
• 
• 
OREN LIMITED & ASSOCIATES, 
A Partnership, • . 
Defendant-Appellant . • 
BRIEF rn OPPQSITIOO 'ID PETITION FOR REHEARTIK; 
STATEMENT' OF THE NATURE OF THE C'A5E 
'!his is Plaintiff-Respondents Petition for a Rehearing fran a decision 
of this Court reversing a Jury Verdict and Judgment in the Second Judicial 
District Court, In and For Davis Cotmty, the Honorable calvin Gould, Judge, 
against Defendant-Appellant. 
THE UTAH SUPREME CDURT DID NZI' MISCDNSrRUE THE FACT'S OF THE 
CASE OR MISINI'ERPRET APPLICABLE LAW. 
Plaintiff-Resp:>ndent in his Menorandum of Points and Authorities in 
Support of Petition for Rehearing raises the arguments that this Court either 
grossly misconstrued the facts of the case or misinterpreted the applicable 
lawsJ in as far as Defendant in the lCMer Court was required to raise the 
licensing statute as an Affirmative Defense, or that the applicable licensing 
statute does not protect the Defendant. 
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'lhese arguments are incorrect, as a canparison of August 29, 1983, 
opinion with Plaintiff's arguments clearly revealed. Further Plaintiff 
misinterprets the public policy reasons behind the licensing statute and the 
protections it is designed to afford. 
In a somewhat convoluted argument Plaintiff appears to wish to convince 
this Court that adequate protection and safeguards existed to insure the 
quality of Plaintiff's work so that the Utah Licensing Statute, Section 
58-23-1 Utah Code Annotated, is nugatory. This is clearly wrong, also the 
opinion language clearly indicates that the Court was aware of what protec-
tions other than that statute were afforded the parties and considered them 
in overruling the Lo.ver Court decision. See for example p:tragrath 2 of the 
. Opinion, p:tge 1, stating that the improvements were inspected by the city. 
Although Plaintiff controverts the statement that the improvements were 
designed by Farmington he states himself on p:ige 5 of his Brief that the 
design is not critical to the protection issue, in other words the matter 
which the licensing statute is designed to protect. 
Although footnote 9 does seem to create an inconsistency as to whether 
or not the city engineer inspected the work, the body of the Opinion itself 
acknowledges the fact as urged by the Plaintiff that the city did perform 
regular inspections upon the labor. HCMever the Court finds that inadequate 
to fulfill the public policy reasons behind the licensing statute. The Court 
also faults Plaintiff for his willful disregard of that statute and the Court 
is lDlWilling to shift the burden of the protection contemplated by the statute 
to the inspector ~ay fran the contractor. (See i:ages 6 and 7 of the 
Opinion.) 
-2-
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Court in distinguishing Fillmore Products v. Western Paving, Inc. , 
Utah 1977, 591 P.2d 687 and Lignell v. Berg, 593 P.2d 800 (Utah 1979), fran 
the instant case clearly grasps the factual situation but choses to limit the 
holding of those two cases which established exceptions to the general rule. 
The Court in tage 5 of its Opinion cites Lignell to shCM that a litigant is 
not a member of the protected class if he can obtain the required protection 
through another means, but then goes on to interpret the facts of this case 
to establish that another means was not available. For all of Plaintiff's 
arguments of econanic hardship or in equity, ignores the simple fact that all 
of these problems could have been avoided had he simply chosen to comply with 
the licensing statute and not chosen instead to attempt to make his 
. ineffective statement against the "bureaucracy". rrhe arguments that this 
Court made distinguishing the incident case from Lignell and Fillmore 
shCM that it must have had a workable grasp of the facts. Plaintiff next 
attempts to convince this Court that the lack of a license is an Affirmative 
Defense which must have been plead by the Defendant at the time of trial. In 
making this assertion he canpletely ignores the holding Meridian Corp. y. 
MC!2lynn cardwaker Coopany , 567 P.2d 1110 (Utah 1977), the Court in that 
case stated "this Court has held that the contracts of unlicensed contractors 
are void" supra p:ige 1110. Further that case cites Smith v. American 
Packing & Provision Co. , 102 Utah 351, 130 P.2d 951 (1942), stating that it 
necessary for the Plaintiff to allege that he had the license in order to 
state a cause of action. In other words license is a necessary element of 
Plaintiff's action it is not an Affirmative Defense. Plaintiff had no 
standing therefore this Court was correct in its dismissal of his cause of 
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action. In addition in the case of Cheny v. Rucker , 14 Utah 2d 205 V 81 
P.2d 86 (Utah 1963), establishes the standard in Utah that prejudice is 
necessary before a Court will rule that the other party failed to plead an 
Affirmative Defense. In the present case Plaintiff could not have been 
prejudice by Defendant's failure to plead the Affirmative Defense because he 
had no standing to be in Court in the first place. The Plaintiff also 
attempts to argue licensing statute in.question does not really afford any 
protection to the Defendant. This argument completely ignores the fact that 
the statute has been ruled on over and over again by this Court in the cases 
cited in A~llants original Brief and in this Court's Opinion that the 
purpose of the statute is to insure the protection of the public. (See page 
7 of the August 29th Opinion.) Thus Plaintiff's arguments on page 2 and 3 of 
his Brief that the judicial form allCMs Defendant adequate protection is in 
opposite, as Plaintiff has failed to prove or shav that Defendant was even 
unprotected. As the Court states in page 3 of its Opinion citing Fillmore 
Products , supra , "the p:irty who does not obtain a license, but is required 
to do so, can not obtain relief to enforce terms of his contract." 
THIS CASE OOES WI' MEE1'I' THE UTAH STANDARD OF RE.VIEW FOR REHEARilN 
Utah Law dictates that no rehearing will be granted when nothing new or 
important is offered for consideration. Ducheneau v. House , 4 Utah 483, 
11P618; Jones v. House , 4 Utah 484, 11P619. In the incident case Plaintiff 
has not offered any new facts for the consideration of this Court. He is 
once again merely urging his particular interpretation of the old facts 
previously viewed by this Court. 
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In the case of CUmnings v. Nielson , 4 Utah 157, 129P619, the Utah 
Supreme Court cited the follooing four reasons justifying applying for a 
rehearing. 
1. That the Court had misconstrued or overlooked sane material fact or 
facts. 
2. '!bat the Court had overlooked a statute or decision 
3. '!bat the Court had based the decision on a wrong principle of law 
4. The Court had either misapplied or overlooked something which 
materially affected the result. 
In reading through the Opinion it can not be reasonably said that any of 
these reasons apply. The Court is aware of all of the facts in our action 
with the licensing statute, applied the pro~r legal principles and it is 
apparent fran the language and the depth of the Opinion is conversant with 
all of the facts. Finally, Plaintiff's contention that he should be able to 
" recover the pipe would not only lead to econanic waste in this case.I but as a 
new point first brought up to the supreme Court's attention on this 
application for hearing,even though it was available on the origional 
hearing,'Ehus it can not be considered. see Harrison v. Harker , 44 u.541 
142P, 716, further the language of the case is, supra , indicate that not 
just the contract is void and unenforceable if no license but that "no cause 
of action is stated unless a licensed is alleged." See Smith and Meridian 
Corporation , supra. The language that the contractor can not recover 
payment should be construed brcA1ly, particularly struction contract where 
there is no reason to distinguish between the labor and materials. More 
mportantly
1
of the Briefs already on record and fran the facts given in the 
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Opinion it is obvious that the Plaintiff has been paid large sums already. 
He is now asking the Court to go back and determine ho.v much of those funds, 
if any, paid for the pipes alone, what percentage or hCM many of the pipes 
could be removed etc., this is contrary to opinions indicating that either 
the rule applies and there is no canpensation or that the exceptions apply 
and the contractor recovers. 'there is no middle grotmd allCMing for a 
recovery off the contract. This is particularly true when the Plaintiff has 
already been paid some sums. 
cnJCWSION 
'lbere is no real indication that the Supreme Court misconstrued the 
facts of the case or misapplied the applicable principles of law. '!he 
holding of a contractors license is a necessary requirement for the Plaintiff 
to state a cause of action. 'Ibis Court's holding that no such license was 
held effectively bars the Plaintiff fran any recovery for either services or 
materials provided, especially when he has already received large sums of 
money sufficient to pay him for his pip:s. The arguments that the licensing 
statutes sole purpose is to protect the Defendant in this case ignores the 
public policy arguments of protecting the public in general and the 
contractors failure to be properly relicensed has been appropriately 
sanctioned by this Court by dismissing this cause of action. Plaintiff's 
Brief does not raise any points sufficient to allCM a revie.w or rehearing 
before this Court. The recovery of the pi~s at this point is econanic wasteJ 
is an issue raised for the first time on appeal or on this rehearing~ not 
I\ 
be considered by this Court. Defendant therefore respectfully requests that 
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the suprene Court reaffirm its opinion previously entered in this case. 
Respectfully subnitted this ~ day of October, 1983. 
PACE, 
BY 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
OREN LTD. & ASSOCIATES 
1200 University Club Building 
136 Fast south Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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Q)RTIFICATE OF MAIL:tro 
I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief on 
Appeal to cotmsel for Plaintiff-Respondent: 
S'IE:mEN G. HOMER 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 483 
West Jordan, Utah 84084 
postage prepaid this &ft_ day of October, 1983. 
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